A temperature-limited assessment of the risk of Rift Valley

fever transmission and establishment in the continental

United States of America by Konrad, Sarah K. & Miller, Scott N.
A temperature-limited assessment of the risk of Rift Valley
fever transmission and establishment in the continental
United States of America
Sarah K. Konrad, Scott N. Miller
Department of Ecosystem Science and Management, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
Abstract. The rapid spread of West Nile virus across North America after its introduction in 1999 highlights the potential
for foreign arboviruses to become established in the United States of America. Of particular concern is Rift Valley fever virus
(RVFV), which has been responsible for multiple African epidemics resulting in death of both humans and livestock, as well
as major economic disruption due to livestock loss and trade restrictions. Modern globalization, travel, and commerce allow
viruses to easily jump from one continent to another; and it is likely only a matter of time before RVFV reaches North
American shores. We used a degree-day model in combination with livestock population data and a pathways analysis to
identify regions and times where RVFV is most likely to enter and become established in the United States of America.
Transmission risk of the disease varies across the country from 325 annual risk days in parts of Florida to zero risk days in
the far North and in high mountain regions. Areas of particular concern are where there are a high number of possible trans-
mission days, a large livestock population, and proximity to likely locations for the disease to enter the country via mos-
quito vector or human host. These areas should be monitored closely during transmission “risk seasons” so that if the virus
does enter the country and begins to become established, it can be quickly controlled and eliminated before spreading fur-
ther. Areas most at risk include the Baltimore and New York City metro areas as well as much of the region between these
urban centers; most of Texas, especially around Houston; Florida; Atlanta; southwest Nebraska; southern California and
Arizona; and the central valley of California.
Keywords: Rift Valley fever, virus transmission, Culex tarsalis, United States of America, geographical information systems,
West Nile virus.
Introduction
Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) (Bunyaviridae:
Phlebovirus) was first characterized by Daubney et al.
(1931) in what is now the Republic of Kenya. RVFV is
an insect-borne virus endemic to sub-Saharan Africa,
whose vectors include multiple mosquito species as
well as some species of biting flies (Meegan and Bailey,
1988; Turell et al., 1996, 2008). Laboratory tests
show at least one North American mosquito species,
Culex tarsalis, to be a competent vector for RVFV
(Turell et al., 2010). Domestic animals are the primary
reservoir host for this zoonotic disease, which causes
high mortality and abortion in cattle, sheep, and
goats, and also affects humans, sometimes fatally
(Geisbert and Jahrling, 2004). 
The objective of this study is to spatially and tem-
porally identify the regions in the continental United
States of America (USA) where RVFV is most likely to
gain entry and become established, so that surveillance
and control tools can be targeted to greatest effect.
Given the highly globalized nature of business com-
merce and travel, it is probable that RVFV will reach
the USA in much the same manner as the West Nile
virus (WNV), which arrived in New York in 1999 and
spread across North America within just a few years
(Enserink, 2002). Should RVFV become established in
the USA, it would pose a serious health threat to both
humans and livestock with financial ramifications esti-
mated at billions of dollars to the livestock industry
(Pearson, 2000). 
RVFV epizootics in Africa are associated with peri-
ods of heavy rainfall which lead to the hatching of
large populations of vector mosquitoes (Davies et al.,
1985). However, periods of extreme rainfall and
flooding are not generally associated with outbreaks
of arboviruses in temperate climates such as the conti-
nental USA (Nasci and Moore, 1998). Rather, previ-
ous research has shown temperature to be a limiting
factor of arbovirus transmission (e.g. Hurlbut, 1973;
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Reisen et al., 2006; Konrad et al., 2009). In order for
a mosquito to transmit an arbovirus, it must have
completed the extrinsic incubation period (EIP), dur-
ing which time the arthropod becomes infectious. The
length of the EIP depends on three factors: (i) the virus
type (e.g. Moudy et al., 2007); (ii) the mosquito
species (e.g. Turell et al., 1985); and (iii) the tempera-
ture to which the mosquito is exposed after introduc-
tion to the virus (e.g. Reisen et al., 2006). When a
mosquito takes a blood meal from an infected host it
ingests infected blood but is not capable of infecting
other animals until the virus is disseminated through
the mosquito’s body, specifically entering into its sali-
vary glands. This dissemination requires thermal ener-
gy, and since mosquitoes are cold-blooded animals,
energy must be externally applied. If the EIP is com-
pleted during the time period when the mosquito con-
tinues to feed, then the mosquito may infect other ani-
mals. Thus, the temperature to which the mosquito is
exposed during its feeding cycle is critical to determin-
ing whether a virus will become established in a new
territory. 
A pathways analysis of the potential for release of
RVFV into the USA found that the most likely means of
entry are via infected persons or mosquitoes arriving by
an airplane and by infected mosquitoes arriving with a
container ship (Kasari et al., 2008). Between 2001 and
2004, over 97% of all incoming passengers from RVFV-
endemic countries landed at one of six international air-
ports (New York City, Washington DC, Atlanta,
Baltimore, Newark and Houston) and the most fre-
quented seaports for African traffic were Charleston,
Philadelphia and New York. As over half of the visitors
to the USA from RVFV-endemic countries stated that
the purpose of their travel was to visit family, Kasari et
al. (2008) concluded that the 10 states with the highest
populations of African immigrants were likely final des-
tinations for many of these travelers, i.e. California,
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia.
In addition, Alabama and Maine were the final destina-
tion for more than 10% of commodities coming from
countries endemic for RVFV. Taking all of the above
into account, Kasari et al. (2008) concluded that people
and domestic livestock in 14 states are particularly vul-
nerable to RVFV exposure: Alabama, California,
Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 
RVFV entry points that have warm temperatures,
high livestock density, and an abundance of an appro-
priate mosquito species are the most likely regions for
RVFV to become established in the USA. In this paper,
we evaluate the risk of RVFV transmission based on
likely entry points, livestock abundance and analysis
of historical degree-day temperatures. Not every
potential risk factor is examined; notably lacking is
vector abundance, which was difficult to adequately
characterize over the spatial and temporal scale of this
study. Abundance is often believed to depend on the
availability of water, but studies of North American
mosquitoes have shown that this is not a simplistic
relationship. For example, in Colorado, wet spring
conditions increase the abundance of Cx. tarsalis in
the plains, but dry summer conditions increase the
abundance of both Cx. tarsalis and Cx. pipiens
throughout the entire state (Shaman et al., 2010). The
populations of floodwater species such as Aedes vex-
ans increase with precipitation, but species which
breed in eutrophic waters, such as Cx. pipiens, are
negatively correlated with surface wetness (Shaman et
al., 2002). Logistic regression studies have shown that
the abundance of several common North American
mosquito species, including Cx. tarsalis, is primarily
influenced by degree-day temperatures rather than
precipitation (Lysyk, 2010). Because of this, we relied
upon the critical and limiting factor of temperature to
identify regions and dates when virus transmission
risk is theoretically possible, and upon livestock densi-
ty to identify areas of likely establishment and impact. 
Materials and methods
In this study, we built upon the foundation of previ-
ous work (Konrad et al., 2011) significantly expand-
ing the study area from five states to the entire con-
tiguous USA. However, the methods remain mostly
unchanged from Konrad et al. (2011). We used a
degree-day model (Zou et al., 2007; Konrad et al.,
2009, 2011) to assess historical temperature data and
determine when and where local temperatures permit
virus transmission. Daily maximum and minimum
temperatures were downloaded from DAYMET
(http://www.daymet.org, Thornton et al. 1997) on a
10-km grid for the contiguous USA for the most recent
10-year time period available (January 1, 1994 to
December 31, 2003). These data were compiled to
produce an average temperature maximum and mini-
mum for each day of the year at every grid point.
Other inputs to the degree-day model included the
length of the vector feeding period (the time between
the mosquito’s first and last blood meal), the degree-
days to EIP for the virus and vector in question, and
the minimum transmission threshold temperature.
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Model output consisted of spatial and temporal trans-
mission risk maps that can be created on a yearly basis
(number of annual risk days) or a daily basis (areas
either at risk or not at risk on a given day).
The degree-days necessary to reach EIP are strongly
dependent on both the virus type and the species of
mosquito. Since RVFV has yet to become established
in the USA, this parameter cannot be directly meas-
ured nor calibrated with field data (e.g. Konrad et al.,
2011). Turell et al. (2011) evaluated the potential for
North American arthropods (including Cx. erraticus,
Cx. erythrothorax, Cx. nigripalpus, Cx. pipiens, Cx.
quinquefasciatus, Cx. tarsalis, Ae. dorsalis, Ae. vex-
ans, Anopheles quadrimaculatus and Culicoides
sonorensis) to transmit RVF, and found that only Cx.
tarsalis transmitted the disease efficiently. The rela-
tionship between temperature and transmission rates
of RVFV in Cx. tarsalis has yet to be quantified in the
field but, similar to WNV, the virus is not temperature-
limited in the warm, African continent where it is
endemic. Other researchers are attempting to establish
a temperature/transmission relationship in the labora-
tory but in the current absence of reliable data we used
previously identified parameters for WNV transmis-
sion in Cx. tarsalis as a “best guess” proxy for RVFV
(Turell MJ, personal communication). The critical
parameters for WNV transmission were successfully
calibrated and tested with field data from California
by Konrad et al. (2009), in which the number of
degree-days to reach EIP was determined to be 76,
with a minimum temperature for the calculation of
degree-days of 14.3°C, and a maximum of 12 days
between the first and last blood meal, which is the sum
of three four-day gonotrophic cycles (Reisen et al.,
1993). If new parameters specific to RVFV become
available, they can be easily substituted into the model
to produce updated results. The degree-day calcula-
tions used in this study follow Allen (1976) and
depend on the minimum and maximum temperatures
observed during a 24-hour period. Equation 1 was
used to calculate degree-days to EIP (°D) when the
minimum observed temperature is above the minimum
threshold for the calculation of degree-days (Tl)
.             (1)
When the minimum temperature (Tmin) is less than
Tl, but the maximum observed temperature (Tmax) is






When Tmax is less than Tl, no calculation is per-
formed and the day is assigned zero degree-days.
Our approach was to calculate the degree-day value
for each cell in the contiguous USA for each calendar day
using the 10-year averages for maximum and minimum
temperature for each day. We calculated the cumulative
12-day degree-day total (corresponding to the feeding
period window) for each day by adding the degree-days
from each of the previous 11 days to the day in question.
In this way we could identify the spatial and temporal
locations of areas at risk for virus transmission.
The regions most at risk for the establishment and
subsequent economic impact of RVFV are those where
the mosquito vectors are present, degree-day tempera-
tures are high enough for the virus to reach EIP in the
host mosquitoes for a high proportion of the year, and
there is a large concentration of livestock hosts.
Although mosquito vectors are able to transmit RVFV
when the temperatures are sufficiently high, RVFV is
unlikely to gain a foothold without the presence of a
suitable reservoir for the virus. As domestic livestock
have proved to be the primary reservoir in African
countries (Geisbert and Jahrling, 2004), we assumed
that the same will be true in the USA. The degree-day
temperature assessment reflects the risk of RVFV
transmission; greater livestock density in RVFV risk
areas implies an increased chance of RVFV establish-
ment in a domestic animal reservoir and a greater
potential economic impact to the livestock industry.
Therefore, we evaluated both transmission risk and
compound risk (temperature and livestock based).
Compound risk was assessed by normalizing the num-
ber of transmission risk days per year and the livestock
density on linear scales, summing these and mapping
them onto a relative-risk scale. If the degree-days never
reach the required temperature (zero risk days), the
compound risk was also assumed to be zero. 
Livestock data from the 2007 agricultural census
were obtained from the Department of Agriculture
National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS)
(http://www.nass.usda.gov). We calculated total live-
stock densities by summing together cattle and calf,
sheep and lamb, and goat populations (the most com-
mon hosts for RVFV) at the county level. In the small
°D = - Tl
Tmax + Tmin 
2
°D = - Tl   *       - θi   + a * cosθi1 2π
(Tmax + Tmin) π
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percentage of cases where population numbers for spe-
cific counties were withheld by the USDA to protect
privacy, we back-calculated the populations by appor-
tioning the state total across the unreported counties in
proportion to the number of farms in each county. The
total livestock densities are shown in Fig. 1.
We performed an in-depth analysis on the 14 states
and six international airports identified by Kasari et al.
(2008) as the most likely entry points for the virus. In
addition to assessing the degree-day totals using the
WNV threshold value of 76 degree-days as determined
by Konrad et al. (2009) in California, we evaluated the
transmission risk for ±20 degree-days (28.5%) in each
of these critical regions. It is probable that °D for RVFV
in Cx. tarsalis does not precisely match that for WNV
in Cx. tarsalis, introducing a great deal of uncertainty
into our transmission risk predictions. The choice to
vary °D by ±20 degree-days is not tied to any particular
prediction of the threshold value for RVFV. However,
other studies have used values such as 109 degree-days
(Reisen et al., 2006) and 82 degree-days (Schrag et al.,
2011) for the °D of WNV transmission in Culex spp.,
which provides an idea of the basic variation of °D for
different mosquito species and virus genotypes. We var-
ied °D by ±28.5% to get a sense of how different values
affect the risk transmission estimates, rather than illus-
trate a precise range of possibilities.
Results
The predicted number of annual risk days provides
a comprehensive view of temperature-based transmis-
sion risk in the continental USA (Fig. 2). The number
of risk days per year varied from zero in the very north
of the country and in high elevations of the Rocky
Mountains to 325 in southernmost Florida. The high-
est transmission-risk areas (reddish hues in Fig. 2)
included the Southwest, specifically southeast
California and southwest Arizona, and much of south-
ern Texas and Florida. The southern states and the
central valley of California were at increased risk,
while the eastern seaboard, the midwest, and the
lower parts of the intermountain west were all at mod-
erate risk. Northern states and high altitude regions
remain always at low risk.
In order to evaluate the effects of livestock density
on RVFV transmission risk, we examined the com-
pound risk map of normalized transmission risk days
and livestock density (Fig. 3). In general, this map
showed a similar pattern as the temperature-based
map with risk being high in the south and in
California and low in the north and in the Rocky
Mountains. However, certain areas of high livestock
density in the midwest, the central valley of California,
and even Pennsylvania and Idaho, showed levels of
compound risk on par with those of the southern
states: note for example the elevated risk in northwest
Texas and the significantly elevated risk in southeast
Pennsylvania. The central valley of California turned
out to be of higher relative risk, while that of south-
west Arizona is reduced due to the lower proportions
of livestock in those areas. Fig. 3 is thus a refinement
on the relative risk of transmission with some areas
showing elevated and others a reduced level of risk.
Fig. 1. Livestock density by US county in 2007 (data from USDA-NASS).
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The risk for RVFV transmission can also be inspect-
ed on a daily basis for the entire country grid (Fig. 4).
Any day of the year can be mapped to show regions
that are at risk for transmission (red shades) and
regions that are not at risk (blue shades). The grada-
tions in shading show the difference between the local
summed degree-day temperature and °D (76 degree-
days). Strong coloring represents degree-day sums
much higher or lower than 76 degree-days, while
lighter tones are closer to 76 degree-days. In this
example we compared six dates to demonstrate the
spatial rise and diminishment of risk during the year.
On February 1, only the southernmost tip of Florida
was at risk; by April 1, southern Florida and the
southern tip of Texas were at risk; on June 1, most of
the south and the central valley of California were at
risk; on August 1, the majority of the states were at
risk; October 1 showed lessening of the risk resem-
bling that of June; and the risk on December 1 was
again limited to the southern tip of Florida.
Our analyses can be used to more closely examine
the risk of transmission at the states (Fig. 5) and the
international airports (Fig. 6) identified by the Kasari
et al. (2008) pathways analysis. The figures show the
Fig. 2. Total temperature-based risk days over the course of a year.
Fig. 3. Compound risk map based on the sum of normalized transmission risk and normalized livestock density. If the temperature-
based transmission risk is zero, the compound risk is also assumed to be zero.
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dates that these locations were at risk, based on the
historical temperature data averaged over the 10-year
period from 1994-2003, using °D equal to 76 degree-
days. The graphs also show the effect on the length of
the “risk season” of varying °D by ±20 degree-days
(28.5%).
Florida was shown to be the state most at-risk of
transmission and virus establishment, with parts of the
state at risk for 325 days of the year using the stan-
dard °D equals 76 degree-days scenario. If °D is low-
ered to 56 degree-days, however, much of the state
becomes at-risk throughout the entire year. In general,
the number of days carrying transmission risk in a
state decreased inversely with latitude, to a minimum
of 57 risk days per year in Maine (July and part of
August). The same pattern was true for the major air-
ports, with risk days per year varying from 187 in
Houston (with April as the onset of risk) to 91 at John
F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York
(with late June as the onset of risk). Under the °D
equals 56 degree-days scenario, the number of risk
days annually varied from 215 in Houston to 107 at
JFK, whereas there were 163 risk days per year pre-
dicted in Houston and 71 at JFK under the °D equals
96 degree-days scenario. Evaluated at the six airports,
there was a 12.8-22.3% decrease in the number of
annual risk days associated with increasing °D by
28.5%, and a 14.0-18.1% increase in the number of
annual risk days associated with reducing °D by
28.5%. The effect of changing °D fell within a similar
Fig. 4. Temperature-based transmission risk on select days throughout the year. Blue shades reflect no risk, red shades reflect risk.
The lighter the shading, the closer the summed degree-day temperatures are to 76 degree-days.
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range for the 14 pathways states, with the exception of
the northern states of Maine, Minnesota and
Massachusetts, which show a greater percent change
due to the fact that these states had very few annual
risk days under the standard °D equals 76 degree-days
scenario.
Discussion 
The transmission risk maps and graphs of local risk
seasons were designed to be used by risk managers and
local vector control districts to target regions and dates
in need of surveillance for possible entry and establish-
ment of RVFV into the USA. Although the main entry
points had already been identified by pathways analy-
sis (Kasari et al., 2008), this study allows risk man-
agers to focus efforts specifically upon the risk seasons
and not spend time and money on surveillance and/or
control methods at times of the year when RVFV trans-
mission risk is not possible. 
To demonstrate how this information can be best
used, we focused on an area of particularly high risk in
the northeastern USA. Four of the major entry-point
airports (JFK, Washington Dulles, Newark, and
Baltimore) are located within several hundred kilome-
ters of each other. Nearby is Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania, home to a large community of Amish
people and a high livestock density (primarily dairy
cows). Lancaster is the only very high livestock densi-
ty county located within 100 Km of any of the major
entry-point airports. This region should be viewed as
at special risk as it is home to multiple entry pathways
for RVFV, has a large population of reservoir animals,
and is at risk for over three months of the year. The
risk maps allowed us to chart a detailed progression of
transmission risk at the onset of the risk season (Fig.
7). On June 9, there was no transmission risk in the
region. Two days later, Baltimore/Washington
International Airport was at risk. In another two days,
Washington Dulles was also at risk, and the at-risk
region was bordering Lancaster county. On June 15,
the southern tip of the Lancaster country was at risk,
and on June 17, most of the county was at risk as well
as Newark International Airport. By June 19, all four
major airports as well as Lancaster county were at risk
of RVFV transmission, and this risk remained constant
in the region through September. Extra precautions
might be warranted in the summer months, as high-
risk areas, such as this one, are the most likely regions
for RVFV both to enter, and to become established, in
the USA. Although the livestock densities are not as
high in the vicinities of Atlanta and Houston, these
Fig. 5. The predicted “risk season” of the 14 states deemed most
at risk by pathways analysis (Kasari et al 2008), shown with
three different values of °D. The total length (in days) of the risk
season is shown to the right of each bar. 
Fig. 6. The predicted “risk season” of the 6 international air-
ports deemed most at risk the pathways analysis, shown with
three different values of °D. The total length (in days) of the risk
season is shown to the right of each bar.
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southern regions have much longer risk seasons and
should be considered for monitoring as well. By know-
ing the risk seasons of likely entry points, monitoring
can be targeted towards the appropriate time of year.
Outside of the risk season, there is minimal chance of
RVFV becoming established, as the temperatures are
not high enough to allow vector-borne disease trans-
mission. Other areas of particularly high risk include
Florida, Atlanta, southwest Nebraska, southern
California and Arizona, and the central valley of
California.
If global warming follows the predictions of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(http://www.ipcc.ch/), onset dates of the risk seasons
would tend to come slightly earlier and the end dates
slightly later than those predicted based on the histor-
ical averages. Comparison of temperature data from a
standard Global Climate Model for the year 2030
with the historical DAYMET data shows an increase
of annual risk days in Nebraska from about three
months to four months (Konrad et al., 2011).
Although current temperatures are not as warm as
those predicted for 2030, they are somewhat warmer
than the 1994-2003 temperatures upon which this
analysis is based.
The most important variable in this study is °D, for
which we use 76 degree-days based on the time and
temperature required for Cx. tarsalis to transmit
WNV. Obviously, it would be preferable to use a
parameter that specifically reflects the time and tem-
Fig. 7.  The onset of transmission risk in the region including four of the major RVFV-entry airports and the livestock-dense
Lancaster county, Pennsylvania (crosshatched area). Red shades show at risk areas, blue shades show not at-risk areas; the lighter
shades reflect degree-day sums closer to °D (in this case, 76 degree-days).
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perature necessary for Cx. tarsalis to transmit RVFV.
Laboratory experiments are currently underway to
determine this parameter (MJ Turell, personal com-
munication) and once it is known, it is a straightfor-
ward task to update the outcome of the model through
new input data and thus produce new risk maps. In
addition, some North American Ae. vexans mosqui-
toes have been shown to transmit RVFV, although the
same species from another part of the country do not
(Turell et al., 2010), suggesting that regional calibra-
tion of the model would be the ideal approach. If and
when RVFV does come to the USA, temperatures can
be monitored in areas where RVFV is being transmit-
ted by local vectors in order to field calibrate the lab-
oratory numbers. We are currently working towards
an online version of the model, which will allow users
access to real-time risk assessment as well as the abili-
ty to vary the transmission parameters. Given knowl-
edge of the appropriate parameters, the degree-day
model can be used to assess transmission risk of not
just RVFV, but any arbovirus.
The spatial analyses discussed here will be of most
use within the hands of local vector control districts,
who know when and where the local mosquito popu-
lations are active. The transmission maps only show
where and when transmission is theoretically possible;
when combined with mosquito abundance data, they
will effectively target problem areas and dates where
elimination efforts will do the most good.
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